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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
THE NEGOTIABILITY OF CORPORATE BONDS AND
OTHER INVESTMENT SECURITIES
The Negotiable Instruments Law did not specifically encompass
Corporate securities, though the issuance of corporate bonds as a method of
raising capital had come into general use with the building of the national
system of canals and railroads' prior to the War Between the States, and
though the consensus of turn-of-the-century investors was that such instru-
ments were undoubtedly negotiable. 2 Thus, the N.I.L. apparently by
design, did not attempt to resolve the then existing split in authority as to the
negotiability of corporate bonds, debentures and other investment secu-
rities. 3 Perhaps it was assumed that corporate securities would be treated in
the courts as falling outside of the specific substantive provisions of the
statute, and that negotiability could therefore be predicated upon N.I.L. §
196, a section of the statute designed to permit cases not therein provided for
to be governed by the law merchant. 4
In any event, many courts continued the pre-N.I.L. practice of
requiring such securities to adhere to the formal requisites of negotiability
incorporated into N.I.L. § 1 and predictably-and presumably to the
detriment of the market for such securities-negotiability was often found
wanting. Applying the N.I.L. to investment securities was perhaps a rigged
game in the sense that "investment paper" was, and is, quite different than
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See generally POOR, HISTORY OF RAILROADS AND CANALS (1860), cited in R.
STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER 198 (3d ed. 1964).
2. See W. HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLEC-
TIONS 29-30 (1967) [hereinafter cited as HAWKLAND]; Israels, Investment Securities as
Negotiable Paper, 13 Bus. LAW. 676 (1958).
3. Some pre-N.I.L. decisions seemingly held corporate bonds negotiable as a
matter of routine, perhaps in deference to the expectations of investors. See, e.g.,
The Junction R.R. Co. v. Cleneay, 13 Ind. 161 (1859); American Nat'l. Bank v.
American Wood Paper Co., 19 R.I. 149,32 Atd. 305 (1895). But other decisions found
negotiability to be a matter of the ability of the instrument to satisfy the formal
requisites of negotiability as developed in common law decisions. See authorities
collected at note 5, infra.
4. HAWKLAND at 30. The provision was enacted as § 195 in Louisiana.
5. See, e.g., Kohn v. Sacramento Elec. Gas & Ry. Co., 168 Cal. 1, 141 Pac. 626
(1914); King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481, 199 N.W. 437 (1924); President and
Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926).
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ordinary "commercial paper," 6 and that difference, usually taking the form
of lengthy, complicated language, "incorporating" recitals, "subject to"
clauses and other "luggage," 7 made it quite difficult for a court to both find
negotiability under N.I.L. § 1 and to maintain judicial peace of mind.' Yet,
many decisions did find negotiability in cases involving investment paper,
even in the face of "subject to" clauses which would ordinarily have
relegated such paper to the non-negotiable bin-with the unfortunate result
that cases containing the strained reasoning necessary to hold investment
paper negotiable became precedent for cases involving "subject to" clauses
in commercial paper.9 Thus, the formal exclusion of investment securities
from the scope of the N.I.L. not only had an obvious negative effect on the
securities market but also led to judicial action equally harmful to the
predictability and administrative ease intended by the N.I.L. to attend the
handling of commercial paper.
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code excludes from its scope the
entire field of investment securities'0 and Chapter 3 of the Louisiana
Commercial Laws, as a substantive adoption of that UCC article, does
likewise. " Thus, a decision such as Schulingkamp v. Vista Shores Club,' 2
finding a corporate debenture note negotiable, will, to the extent that such
debenture notes are in fact "investment securities" within the meaning of
LA. R.S. 10:3-103(1), be difficult to duplicate under the Commercial
Laws,' 3 for at present an instrument can only be negotiable in Louisiana if
Chapter 3 so permits. In the other forty-nine states negotiability of invest-
ment securities can be found in Article 8 of the UCC. Not only did Louisiana
not adopt that Article,14 but our courts are presently left with the perplexing
6. UCC Comment I to § 3-103 (LA. R.S. 10:3-103 (1974)) makes it clear that
when the statute refers to "commercial paper" it means drafts, checks, certificates
of deposit, and notes as defined in § 3-104(2).
7. Professor Hawkland attributes the well-known description of negotiable
instruments as "couriers without luggage" to Chief Justice Gibson in Overton v.
Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (1846). HAWKLAND at 31 n.30.
8. The "subject to" clause was a common cause of the difficulty.
9. See Dean Beutel's discussion of Newman v. Schwarz, 180 La. 153, 156 So.
206 (1934), and the so-called "same sentence doctrine" in Beutel, Common Law
Judicial Technique and the Law of Negotiable Instruments-Two Unfortunate Deci-
sions, 9 TUL. L. REV. 64, 73-76 (1934).
10. See UCC § 3-103(1).
11. LA. R.S. 10:3-103(1) (1974).
12. 318 So.2d 907 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
13. The case arose prior to the effective date of the Commercial Laws.
14. Dean Hebert pointed out what he referred to as the "temporary hiatus
resulting from the non-enactment of Article 8" shortly after the 1974 enactment of
the Commercial Laws. See "Message from Paul M. Hebert, Dean, Louisiana State
University Law School," at page v. of R. HERSBERGEN, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
problem of defining "investment security'--the solution to which problem
is not in the least aided by § 10:3-103(1) or by other definitional sections of
the Commercial Laws such as §§ 10:1-201 and 10:3-102.11 In short, we
know that investment securities cannot be negotiable under Chapter 3 of the
Commercial Laws (and therefore cannot be negotiable at all, in the absence
of the adoption of UCC Article 8), but we have no guidance at all in defining
the creature. In view of the definitional orientation of the Commercial
Laws, a judicially supplied definition would seem to be an undue encroach-
ment into the legislative arena. And, while LA. R.S. 10:1-103 performs for
the Commercial Laws about the same function as did former LA. R. S. 7:195
(N.I.L. § 196) by applying the other laws of Louisiana to cases or situations
not covered by the Commercial Laws, 16 that section would not seem to
apply to the issue of the negotiability of investment securities, since that
situation is covered by § 10:3-103(1). 1
THE LIABILITY OF PARTIES TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-
ESTABLISHING THE VALIDITY OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE
PARTY TO BE CHARGED
The Commercial Laws contain procedural requirements that will
change the tactics of counsel regarding denial of signatures on negotiable
BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS IN LOUISIANA: THE COMMERCIAL LAWS (1974).
15. Comment 2 to UCC § 3-103 points out, however, that an instrument can be
both "negotiable" under § 3-104 and a "security" under Article 8, and observes that
such is possible because the formal requisites of negotiability (§ 3-104) go to matters
of form exclusively, while the definition of "security" in § 8-102 looks principally to
the manner in which the instrument is used. An instrument falling under both
definitions would be controlled by Article 8, not Article 3. See UCC § 3-103(1); LA.
R.S. 10:3-103(l) (1974).
16. See Comment of the Louisiana State Law Institute, LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (1974).
17. But see Justice Cardozo's comments in President and Directors of Manhattan
Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926), in reply to the argument of counsel
that § 196 of the N.I.L. permitted negotiability of corporate certificates to be based on
the law merchant:
The law merchant cannot prevail against prohibitions so specific. In holding
otherwise, we should do more than supplement the statute. We should disregard
and contradict it. The plaintiff's case is not helped by section [196] . . .to the
effect that, "in any case not provided for in this chapter the rules of the law
merchant shall govern." The difficulty is that the case is provided for. Unfore-
seen situations may reveal gaps in the statutory rules. In such circumstances the
law merchant is competent to fill them. It is without power to annul what the
statute has ordained.
Id. at 49-50, 150 N.E. at 597-98. What the Louisiana statute appears to "ordain"
is that investment securities, however defined, are not negotiable. Cf. White Sys.,
Inc. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d 227 (1951). It is anticipated that Article 8 will be
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instruments. In Allen Brothers Feed Co. v. Slaven, 18 the defendant
and purported maker of a promissory note in default pleaded by way of
general denial to the allegations of the plaintiff pertaining to, inter alia, his
signature on the note and under cross examination at trial repeatedly denied
the validity of his signature on the note and ultimately equivocated by
proclaiming that if he signed the note it was not a conscious act.' 9
The Commercial Laws may short-circuit such theatrics, for under LA.
R.S. 10:3-307(1) a signature on an instrument2" is admitted unless specifi-
cally denied in the pleadings. In addition, when the effectiveness 21 of a
signature is put in issue-as in the Slaven case-the burden of establishing
it is on the holder or other party claiming under the signature, 22 but that
burden is considerably aided by a presumption under § 3-307(1)(b) that the
signature is genuine or authorized, as the case may be. "Burden of
establishing" the effectiveness of the signature means that the plaintiff has
the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the effectiveness of the
signature is more probable than its non-effectiveness, 23 while "presump-
tion" is defined by the statute to mean, in the case of § 3-307(1), that the
trier of fact must find that the signature is effective "unless and until
evidence is introduced which would support a finding" of non-
effectiveness.24 A party denying the effectiveness of his signature need not
bring forth evidence sufficient to support a summary ruling in his favor,
25
but the mere self-serving denial exemplified in Slaven would clearly seem
to fall short of rebutting the presumption of § 3-307(1)(b). In the majority of
cases in which the genuineness of signature is at issue, that presumption can
only be rebutted by the testimony of a handwriting expert.
THE RIGHTS OF A MERE TRANSFEREE OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER
Under LA. R. S. 10:3-201(1) the "transfer of an instrument vests in the
transferee such rights as the transferor has therein ... " To the casual
proposed for adoption by the Louisiana State Law Institute at the next regular
session of the Louisiana legislature.
18. 325 So.2d 631 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976). The case arose prior to the effective
date of the Commercial Laws.
19. Id. at 633.
20. Defined in LA. R.S. 10:3-102(l)(e) (1974) as a "negotiable instrument [under
La. R.S. 10:3-104]."
21. That is, the genuine nature of the signature as that of the party charged, or the
authority of that party's alleged agent.
22. LA. R.S. 10:3-307(1)(a) (1974).
23. See id. 10:1-201 (1974) (definition of "Burden of establishing").
24. See id. (definition of "Presumption" or "presumed").
25. See Comment I to UCC § 3-307(1).
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student of the Commercial Laws it may seem, therefore, that if the
transferor was a holder in due course of the instrument and could have not
only brought suit on the instrument, but also have cut off almost all of the
defenses the maker, drawer, or acceptor had,26 the transferee can by virtue
of § 3-201 do the same. But as the plaintiff in N. E. England Associates,
Inc. v. Davis27 learned from the Fourth Circuit, the transfer of an instrument
doesn't always vest in the transferee the ability to get to-and stay at-the
courthouse. In the Davis case the payee obtained a promissory note from the
defendant maker and transferred it to the plaintiff but neglected to endorse
it. Thus the Fourth Circuit, in a non-dispositive portion of the opinion,
points out that the plaintiff's mere possession of the unendorsed instrument
cast upon it the burden of proving his ownership---a burden not met in the
case. A case involving similar facts and arising under the Commercial
Laws 28 might well be decided similarly.
Section 3-201(1) of the Commercial Laws does state, in a simplistic
fashion, that the transferee of a negotiable instrument gets what the
transferor had. But like so many of the provisions of the new law, section
3-201(1) does not lend itself to a simplistic analysis. First, unlike its N.I.L.
predecessors,29 § 3-201(1) does not operate only as to transfers between a
holder-transferor and a holder-transferee, and it is this distinction that leads
to the conclusion that the dictum in Davis would be correct under the
Commercial Laws. In the typical case arising under § 3-201(1), both
transferor and transferee are holders. If the transferor is not the holder of the
instrument, he may literally have no rights at all to pass on to the transferee.
If the transferor is not only a holder, but also a holder in due course, then he
transfers whatever rights he has as such in the instrument. The most
important of the "rights" of the holder in due course are spelled out in LA.
R. S. 10:3-305: "To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes
the instrument free from * * * (2) all defenses of any party to the
instrument . . . except" the "real" defenses set forth therein. Reading
§§ 3-201(1) and 3-305 together, a transferee from a holder in due course is
vested with, and can assert in his own name, the defense cut-off rights of the
transferor. That observation, it turns out, may be true only so long as the
transferee is himself a holder and not a mere transferee.
"Transfer" is a word of broad legal meaning, and has, in fact, no
26. But see F.T.C. Trade Regulation Rule, Preservation of Consumers Claims
and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975) (Effective May 14, 1976).
27. 333 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
28. The Davis case arose prior to the effective date of the Commercial Laws, but
the court cited § 3-201 of the statute.
29. See N.I.L. §§ 49, 58.
[Vol. 37
1977] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1975-1976 411
particular significance in the commercial paper context. 10 This is made clear
by resort to other sections of the Commercial Laws. Attention to § 3-202(1)
quickly reveals the real problem of the plaintiff in Davis: without the
endorsement of the payee on the order paper transferred to him the plaintiff
as not the "holder" of it, for only by "negotiation," a special form of
transfer, does one become a "holder" 3' of instruments that are payable to
order; "negotiation" under § 3-202(1) is the transfer of an instrument in
such form that the transferee becomes a holder, and only a "holder" can
maintain an action on an instrument. 32 In the case of order paper, negotia-
tion under § 3-202(1) is a transfer by delivery33 with any necessary
endorsement. 34 It might be argued that the lack of holder status would not
impede the transferee's action on the note, so long as the transferor was a
30. Cf. Scheid v. Shields, 524 P.2d 1209, 1210 (Ore. 1974). The word "assign-
ment" likewise has little or no utility in the commercial paper context. See Mcllroy
Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 252 Ark. 558, 480 S.W. 2d 127 (1972); Northside Bldg. &
Inv. Co. v. Finance Co. of America, 119 Ga. App. 131, 166 S.E. 2d 608 (1969).
31. Defined as a person who is in possession of a [negotiable] instrument
"drawn, issued or indorsed to him or his order or to bearer or in blank." LA. R.S.
10:1-201 (1974). See United Overseas Bank v. Veneers, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 596 (D.C.
Md. 1974).
32. See Investment Serv. v. Martin Bros., 255 Ore. 192, 465 P.2d 868 (1970);
Lloyd v. Lawrence, 472 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1973). The Martin Bros. case was later
qualified by Scheid v. Shields, 524 P.2d 1209 (Ore. 1974), in which the Supreme Court
of Oregon permitted a plaintiff to maintain an action on the instrument, even though
plaintiff at no time had been in possession of the instrument and admittedly could not,
therefore, be a "holder" of it. The court justified its ruling on the unique circum-
stances of the case, including the fact that the defendant himself had possession of
the note and therefore could not be subjected to double liability on it, and the fact that
the instrument was not "lost." Compare in that regard, UCC § 3-804; LA. Civ. CODE
art. 2280; LA. R.S. 6:69 (1950) and Sweedler v. Oboler, 65 N.Y. Misc. 2d 789, 319
N.Y.S.2d 89 (1971). The court may simply have refused to prolong the inevitable, but
technically speaking, the plaintiff in Scheid should not have been allowed to bring an
action on the instrument in the absence of possession and necessary endorsement.
See discussion in text accompanying notes 33-45, infra. Some N.I.L. decisions held
that a non-holder could maintain an action on an instrument by virtue of § 49.
Denver-Metro Collections, Inc. v. Kleeman, 30 Col. App. 218, 491 P. 2d 64 (1971), is
an example of such decisions, but the reasoning tends to be strained in view of the
fact that § 49 also gave the transferee the right to have the missing endorsement, and
the fact that § 51 entitled only the holder to sue in his own name. Furthermore,
discharge of the maker's liability on the instrument revolved around "payment in due
course" (§ 119) defined in § 88 as payment to the holder.
33. Defined as a "voluntary transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from
one person to another." LA. R.S. 10:1-2-1 (1974).
34. See Northside Bldg. & Invest. Co. v. Finance Co. of America, 119Ga. App.
131, 166 S.E. 2d 608 (1969). Possession is as important as a necessary endorsement-
the absence of either element is fatal to holder status. See Scheid v. Shields, 524 P. 2d
1209 (Ore. 1974).
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holder, since among the transferable rights of a holder is the right to
"enforce payment in his own name, ' 35 and that right is vested in the
transferee by § 3-201(1).36 But once again, close inspection of the statute
reveals that a transferee, who is not himself a holder, is not vested with the
right of the transferor-holder to enforce payment in his own name, 37 for not
only must § 3-301, setting forth the "rights" of a holder, be read in
conjunction with § 3-201(1), but attention must also focus on § 3-603(1):
"The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment. . . to
the holder .... *"38
Thus, only payment to the holder will discharge the liability of a party
to a negotiable instrument; payment to one who has acquired the rights of a
holder under § 3-201(1) would not under § 3-603(1) result in discharge. A
court, then, could hardly compel a defendant in a case such as Davis to pay,
as a matter of liability on the instrument, the amount of the instrument, to a
party to whom payment will not result in a discharge to the defendant on that
instrument. 39 Such a result is consistent with the distinctions drawn in the
35. LA. R.S. 10:3-301 (1974).
36. Cf. Bowling Green, Inc. v. State St. Bank, 425 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1970);
Scheid v. Shields, 524 P.2d 1209 (Ore. 1974). To the extent that Bowling Green and
Scheid permit a transferee to sue on the instrument in his own name, without proving
his status as the holder, the cases are wrong. See discussion in text accompanying
notes 37-45, infra.
37. LA. R.S. 10:3-301 (1974) states that it is the holder who may enforce payment
of the instrument in his own name, except as otherwise provided in LA. R.S. 10:3-603
(1974). Cf. Canyonville Bible Academy v. Lobemaster, 108 111. App. 2d 318,247 N.E.
2d 623 (1969).
38. Emphasis added.
39. See Feldman Constr. Co. v. Union Bank, 28 Cal. App. 3d 731,104 Cal. Rptr.
912 (1972); Lloyd v. Lawrence, 472 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1973). Cf. Scheid v. Shields,
542 P.2d 1209 (Ore. 1974). The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, has held
in Bowling Green, Inc. v. State St. Bank, 425 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1970), that a
depository bank taking an unendorsed order paper item for collection from a
customer who was himself a holder need not establish that it took the item by
negotiation, that is, by endorsement, the court expressing doubt that the concept of
"holder" applies with full force to Article 4 of the UCC. In view of§ 4-209 (requiring
compliance with the requirements of § 3-302), the First Circuit may not be correct, but
the issue tends to become academic, since under § 4-205 (1) such a bank could supply
the missing endorsement anyway. It should also be observed that the State Street
Bank was asserting holder in due course status defensively, so that no question of
compelling the party liable on the instrument to pay a non-holder arose in the case.
Bowling Green was followed in Nida v. Michael, 34 Mich. App. 290, 191 N.W.2d 151
(1971), but criticized in United Overseas Bank v. Veneers, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 596,
603-605 (D. Md. 1974). Commentary has been uniformly critical; see Hawkland,
Depositary Banks as Holders in Due Course, 76 CoM. L.J. 124 (1971); Note, 12 BosT.
COL. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 282 (1970); Note, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 302 (1971).
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Commercial Laws between being a holder, or a holder in due course, and
having the rights as such via § 3-201.4° Section 3-603's "payment. . . to
the holder" language has previously been mentioned; likewise, it can be
observed that the drawer of a draft or check "engages that upon dishonor
• . . and. . . notice of dishonor. . . he will pay the amount of the draft to
the holder"'41 or to any endorser who takes it up; he does not engage to pay
one who-has only the rights of a holder. All endorsers and guarantors make
the same engagement.42 Similarly, those who transfer an instrument by
endorsement make warranties only to their transferee and to subsequent
holders .
Transferees who find themselves in the Davis predicament are not
without enforcement possibilities. Under § 3-201(3) a transferee for value
of an order instrument has, unless otherwise agreed, the "specifically
enforceable right to have the unqualified endorsement of the transferor.""
But the section goes on to state that negotiation, and therefore holder status
under § 3-202, "takes effect only when the endorsement is made" and until
that time "there is no presumption that the transferee is the owner" of the
instrument.45 Lacking the presumption of ownership, the transferee may be
forced to compel the endorsement of the transferor by suit or impleader, or
recover-as the plaintiff in Davis did---on the underlying transaction rather
than on the instrument.
40. Compare LA. R.S. 10:3-305 (1974) with LA. R.S. 10:3-306 (1974).
41. LA. R.S. 10:3-413(2) (1974) (Emphasis added).
42. See LA. R.S. 10:3-414, 3-416 (1974).
43. See LA. R.S. 10:3-417(2) (1974). The same would not be true as to the
warranties arising in the course of bank collections under Chapter 4 of the Commer-
cial Laws. See LA. R.S 10:4-207(2) (1974).
44. See United Overseas Bank v. Veneers, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 596, 603-605 (D.
Md. 1974). The analysis theoretically should be unchanged where the party invoking
the rights of a holder in due course does so defensively (e.g., a bank resisting the
re-crediting of a customer's account) as opposed to offensively. Cf. Bowling Green,
Inc. v. State St. Bank, 425 F.2d 81, 83 (1st Cir. 1970).
45. See Northside Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Finance Co. of America, 119 Ga. App.
131, 166 S.E.2d 608 (1969). UCC Comment I to § 3-201 states that, "Any person who
transfers an instrument transfers whatever rights he has in it" and that the transferee
acquires such rights even though they do not amount to "title" to the instrument. In
view of the language in § 3-201(3), the "title" statement certainly refers to a transfer
of bearer paper, since the transferee of bearer paper may be holder (and hence the
owner) of the paper even though his transferee was a thief or finder who had no title to
the paper. Compare § 3-201(1), with the language of UCC Comment 5 to § 3-306(d):
"The claimant who has lost possession of an instrument so payable [to bearer] or so
indorsed [in blank] that another [the transferee of the thief or finder] may become a
holder [under §§ 1-201, 3-202(1)] has lost his rights on the instrument .. "
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
GOOD FAITH UNDER THE COMMERCIAL LAWS
Good faith is a very important ingredient in the overall scheme of the
Commercial Laws. Every contract or duty within Title 10 "imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement. ,46 Holders must
take an instrument in good faith if they are to be holders in due course. 47 One
who has the right to accelerate payment or performance, or to require
additional collateral "at will" can do so only if he believes in good faith that
the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. 48 To take advantage of
the preclusive effects of § 3-406, a drawee or other payor must have paid the
instrument in good faith, and a non-holder-in-due-course can assert finality
of payment under § 3-418 only if he has in good faith changed his position in
reliance on the payment. Good faith is also an important ingredient in the
relationship between bank and customer.49 All such obligations of good
faith, whether expressly set forth in the statute or implied therein by virtue of
§ 1-203, are immune from disclaimer by agreement. 50
The term is given, however, only the most general definition: "good
faith" means "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 5
Comment 19 to UCC § 1-201 suggests that the definition may be only a
starting point, a bottom line, so to speak, and that observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing may embellish the term, in an
appropriate case.5 2 Given § 1-201's definition, the intended standard in any
event is a subjective one.13 The courts, however, appear to modify that
standard so that subjective honesty in fact has a minimum level of credulity
and fairness below which one cannot venture in confidence that a trier of fact
will not be permitted to find a lack of good faith. 54
46. LA. R.S. 10:1-203 (1974).
47. Id. § 10:3-302(1)(b) (1974).
48. Id. § 10:1-208 (1974). The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the
party against whom the power of acceleration has been exercised. Id.
49. See id. §§ 10:4-103(1); 4-401(2); 4-404 (1974).
50. See id. §§ 10:1-201(3); 4-103(1) (1974). See generally Hersbergen, The Bank-
Customer Relationship Under the Louisiana Commercial Laws, 36 LA. L. REV. 29,
43-55 (1975).
51. LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (1974).
52. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Crone, 301 N.E. 2d 378 (Ind. App. 1973). But see
Third Nat'l. Bank v. Hardi-Gardens Supply of Illinois, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 930 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974).
53. See Balon v. Cadillac Auto Co., 113 N.H. 108, 303 A.2d 194 (1973).
54. See, e.g., National Car Rental v. Fox, 18 Ariz. App. 160, 500 P.2d 1148
(1972); Hollywood Nat'l. Bank v. International Business Machines Corp., 38 Cal. 3d
607, 113 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1974) (permitting negligence to be considered in determining
good faith); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Davis, 116 N.J. Super. 417, 282 A.2d 452 (1971).
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Believable honesty of intent, rather than the absence of circumstances
which would put an ordinarily prudent holder on inquiry, appears to be the
test of good faith, 55 so that the failure of a wholesale automobile buyer to
conduct a lien search, for example, would not prevent it from being in good
faith.56 Thus, the focus is: of what facts and circumstances did the party in
question actually have knowledge at the crucial time? Application of the
test-unchanged by the Commercial Laws-is seen in O'Neal v. Cascio.57
Defendant, having been charged with a violation of federal criminal law,
retained the services of an attorney, giving the latter a promissory note in the
amount of $15,000 as a retainer, payable in twelve monthly installments of
$1250. The $15,000 figure had been arrived at by the defendant and his
lawyer upon the latter's investigation into the nature of the charges and the
kind of legal services needed. Defendant thereafter volunteered to appear
before a grand jury hearing, as a result of which the charges against him
were dropped. Several days after defendant had informed his lawyer that the
charges would be dropped, defendant received from plaintiff a letter
advising defendant that plaintiff had purchased the note from defendant's
lawyer.
At the trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the
Second Circuit, convinced that the verdict necessarily implied that the jury
had found that plaintiff was not a holder in due course for lack of good faith,
affirmed the lower court's judgment on the verdict, pointing out, as
evidence from which the jury could reasonably have determined that the
plaintiff was lacking in good faith: a) that defendant's lawyer knew, prior to
the execution of the note, that the criminal case against the defendant was
weak, possibly fatally so; b) the suspicious circumstances under which
defendant received notice of plaintiff's purchase of the note shortly after he
had informed his lawyer that charges would be dropped; c) the close
friendship and business relationship between plaintiff and defendant's
lawyer; d) believable evidence of a prior subterfuge perpetrated by plaintiff
and defendant's lawyer for the apparent purpose of defeating the creditor's
rights of plaintiff's former wife; e) lack of solid evidence that any "consid-
55. See, e.g., Third Nat'l. Bank v. Hardi-Gardens Supply of Illinois, 380 F.
Supp. 930 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296 Minn. 130, 207 N.W. 2d 282 (1973); Riley v. First
State Bank, 469 S.W. 2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
56. See Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., Inc., 312 N.Y.S. 2d 317, 35
App. Div. 2d 35 (1970). Cf. Hollywood Nat'l Bank v. International Business
Machines Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 607, 113 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1974). But see Slaughter v.
Jefferson Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 590 (D. D.C. 1974).
57. 324 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975). The case arose prior to the effective
date of the Commercial Laws.
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eration" was given by plaintiff for the note. The theoretical distinction
between the subjective and objective standards of good faith-' 'what did he
in fact know?" versus "would a reasonable person in similar circumstances
have been suspicious? "--becomes blurred when the jury is addressing the
crucial question in applying the subjective test: can we reasonably believe
what the plaintiff says he actually knew or did not know?
ITEMS IN THE BANK COLLECTION PROCESS
Chapter 4 of the Commercial Laws, which governs both the relation-
ship between bank and customer, and the collection of items, is completely
new to Louisiana law.58 If the decision of the Fourth Circuit in the
pre-Commercial Laws case of Magee v. T. Smith & Son, Inc. ," is taken as
a reliable indicator, the new law will take some "getting used to," at least in
the Fourth Circuit. In Magee, an employer drew and delivered to an
employee its check, drawn on the First National Bank of Commerce, in
settlement of an injury claim arising out of the course of employment. The
check, which was made payable to the employee, Magee, and to his
attorney, was properly endorsed by the latter in his own behalf and as agent
for co-payee Magee6° pursuant to a power of attorney, and deposited in the
attorney's account in the Hibernia National Bank in New Orleans. Prior to
the endorsement and deposit, but unknown to the attorney, Mr. Magee died.
Upon learning of the posthumous endorsement, the drawer somehow
concluded, for reasons best known to it, that the transaction was not valid,
.and apparently demanded that the drawee, First National Bank of Com-
merce, recredit drawer's account for the amount of the check. Drawee,
already having honored or "paid" the check, made a demand on the
depositary bank for a return of the amount of the check. Hibernia did not
honor the demand, but debited the account of the attorney, 61 and held the
funds. Though multiple litigation resulted,62 the present suit was brought
against the employer by Magee's heirs to enforce the settlement, and against
Hibernia for return of the funds. The Fourth Circuit held that the heirs of
Magee were not proper parties to assert a claim against Hibernia for the
58. The prior law was found in §§ 34, 36, 42, 51, 52, 53, 67, 68 of Title 6 of the
Revised Statutes.
59. 319 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
60. See LA. R.S. 7:41 (repealed in 1974); Cf. LA. R.S. 10:3-116 (1974).
61. 319 So. 2d at 40. The opinion is unclear as to whether Hibernia merely
reversed provisional credit previously given, or actually debited the account on a
charge-back basis against a prior "cashing" of the item. Given the amount of the
check-$12,500.00-it seems unlikely that Hibernia "cashed" the item, though that
is entirely possible.
62. See id. at nn. I & 2.
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return of the funds, but in the course of the opinion dicta appears that is
potentially misleading in relation to Chapter 4 of the Commercial Laws.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Magee rests upon two premises: first,
that no relationship or privity existed between Hibernia and the Magee
heirs; second, that ownership in the decedent-payee was divested by the
endorsement and deposit of the check. With respect to co-payee Magee
alone, the court is probably correct under chapter 4, at least insofar as the
effect of the endorsement of Magee's name is concerned; but the court also
states that endorsement and deposit likewise divested ownership in the
attorney-which could only be correct under Chapter 4 if one adds the
further premise that the check was "cashed" that is, negotiated, rather than
deposited for collection.63
Ordinarily, when a holder of an item deposits it, "unless a contrary
intent clearly appears" the depositary bank' is an agent65 of the holder-
owner, regardless of the form of-or lack of--endorsement. 66 The agency
status thus created ends only when the collection process is completed; 67
until then, the holder-owner, for example, bears the risk of loss. 68 The fact
that Magee's lawyer endorsed and deposited the check in question would
not rebut the agency presumption of R.S. 10:4-201(1), much less divest him
of ownership of the item. Since the collection process arguably was not
completed in Magee-inasmuch as Hibernia retained the funds-the agen-
cy relationship was not terminated;69 and while Hibernia might be a
"debtor," the ordinary relationship of bank-debtor and customer-creditor
which results when the collection process is completed, would not arise. 70
Magee's attorney could, then, have a cause of action against the depositary
bank. 7 '
63. See note 61, supra.
64. See LA. R.S. 10:4-105(a) (1974).
65. See LA. R.S. 10:4-201(1) (1974).
66. Id. The presumption of agency under § 4-201 prevails even if the depositary
bank gives credit for the item or permits immediate withdrawal of the credit.
67. See UCC Comment 4, § 4-201.
68. See LA. R.S. 10:4-212 (1974).
69. See id. 10:4-201(1) (1974); UCC Comment 4, UCC § 4-201.
70. Id.
71. See LA. R.S. 10:3-419(3) (1974); 10:4-103(1) (1974); 10:4-202(1)(a) (1974);
10:4-103(5) (1974). The opinion in Magee seems to suggest that Magee's attorney
might be "the rightful party to assert a cause of action against the bank for return of
the funds," 319 So. 2d at 491; though the court may in fact be correct, such a cause of
action is logically impossible if one is willing to agree with the statement uttered one
judicial breath later that "the check (after endorsement and deposit) is not owned by
the depositor, i.e., the attorney..., but becomes the property of the bank." Id.
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With respect to the relationship between the Magee heirs and Hibernia
Bank, the court may be on more solid ground, though it would be more
precise to say that the heirs have no cause of action against Hibernia, not
because privity is lacking, but because Magee ceased to be a "holder" when
his attorney obtained possession of the check and properly endorsed it.72
One could argue forcefully, in fact, that the Commercial Laws are almost
totally impervious to the concept of "privity," focusing rather on "holder"
status in Chapter 3 and "ownership" of the item-which is usually in the
holder-under Chapter 4. Thus, a payee-depositor may have a right of
action under R. S. 10:3-419(1) against a drawee despite the obvious lack of
privity between them.
Checks made payable to co-payees (i.e. not in the alternative) do
present conceptual, as well as practical, problems for banks. Both payees
may be holders, and therefore holders in due course,7 3 and, if one equates
holder status with "ownership" rights, both payees can be owners. But
holder status is defined in light of the dual requirements of possession and
method of obtaining possession. 74 Clearly, both payees cannot be in actual
possession, but by the same token a drawer or maker cannot technically
"issue" an instrument to co-payees 75 for the same reason-both cannot be
in possession. The Commercial Laws obviously contemplate that posses-
sion of an instrument by one payee is constructive possession by the other,
so that both comply with the definition of "holder" in § 1-201; consistently
therewith, both payees must endorse if a subsequent transferee is to acquire
holder status. 76 Thus, without Magee's valid endorsement, his attorney
could neither have negotiated the check, nor deposited it for collection. 77
With Magee's valid endorsement, his attorney's possession ceased to be
constructively Magee's also, and as the court correctly states, Magee's
ownership, i.e., holder status, likewise ceased therewith. But the owner-
ship of Magee's lawyer, vis-A-vis Hibernia Bank, became whole as a result
of the endorsement, and contrary to the suggestion of the court, his
(Emphasis added). If the attorney was not the "owner" of the check, not only could
he not sue any party in his own name (LA. R.S. 10:3-301 (1974); 3-603 (1974)), he could
not bring an action under LA. R.S. 10:3-419 (1974) either.
72. The act of deposit would be irrelevant to the status of Magee.
73. See LA. R.S. 10:3-302(2) (1974); Comment 2, UCC § 3-302.
74. See id. 10:1-201 (1974) (definition of "holder"); 10:3-202(1).
75. See id. 10:3-102(l)(a) (1974).
76. See id. 10:3-116 (1974); 3-202(1) (1974). Cf. Feldman Const. Co. v. Union
Bank, 28 Cal. App. 3d 731, 104 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1972).
77. A depositary bank in such circumstances could not supply the missing
endorsement of the co-payee. See LA. R.S. 10:4-205(l) (1974); 10:4-104(1)(e) (1974).
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ownership would be divested only by a negotiation to the bank, not by a
deposit for collection. 78
THE BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP-DEATH OF JOINT DEPOSITOR
For a bank, significant problems arise upon the death of its customer,
for competing claimants to the decedent's deposited funds often appear,
wearing different labels and presenting various credentials. In the case of
the check, draft, or other item drawn or issued by the customer against the
deposited funds, and presented for payment or acceptance after his death,
§ 4-405 of the Commercial Laws neatly solves the potential problems by
permitting the bank to accept or pay such items until the bank knows79 of the
death. 80 Even with knowledge of the customer's death a bank may, for ten
days after the date of death, pay or certify checks drawn on or prior to that
date, unless ordered to stop payment by a person claiming an interest in the
account. 8' The bank's position is ideal: authority to pay, collect, or accept
continues in any event until the bank actually knows of the fact of death;
thereafter the authority to pay or certify checks may continue to a day certain
unless any person claiming an interest in the decedent's checking account
orders payment stopped; the bank has no responsibility as to the validity of
the claim,8 2 so that it may refuse payment without fear of wrongful
dishonor. But, as demonstrated by Beals v. City National Bank,83 the death
of a customer can still create litigation for the bank.
The plaintiff in Beals had maintained a joint savings account with the
decedent, and was the latter's universal legatee. However, three brothers
and a sister survived decedent, and these heirs opened decedent's succes-
sion,8 4 and obtained a judgment of possession; pursuant to a certified copy
78. The opinion cites Planters Bank v. Union Bank, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 483
(1872), as supportive of the proposition that the check in Magee became the property
of the bank, but the case is inapposite. The Supreme Court's statements in Planters
Bank are in reference to a deposit of money or moneys collected; a bank would
become the "owner" of such moneys, subject, of course to its obligation as a debtor
vis-a-vis the depositor. The case in no way stands for the proposition that a check
deposited for collection becomes the property of the depositary bank; alternatively a
check "cashed" at the bank would involve neither a deposit of money nor the
collection of that item for the person so "cashing" it.
79. "Knows" is defined in LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (1974) in terms of actual knowledge
of the fact.
80. Items deposited by the decedent for collection also may be collected.
81. LA. R.S. 10:4-405(2) (1974). Items other than checks cannot be paid or
certified with knowledge of death. The justification for the 10-day rule in the case of
checks is found in UCC Comment 3, § 4-405.
82. See UCC Comment 4, § 4-405.
83. 329 So. 2d 828 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
84. Apparently without knowledge of the existence of decedent's will.
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of the judgment the bank released to them the balance of the joint account.
The plaintiff as the universal legatee ultimately prevailed, however, and the
judgment of possession was vacated. Plaintiff thereafter instituted an action
against the bank on the theory that he had not given authority nor received
notice regarding the release of the funds which plaintiff alleged belonged to
him under LA. R.S. 6:32(a). The bank relied in defense of its actions upon
LA. R. S. 6:66, a statute apparently permitting precisely the action taken by
the bank. The First Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the
bank, finding no real conflict between §§ 32(A) and 66 of Title 6. Rather,
the opinion points out that, as in the case of the post-death presentment of a
decedent's check, the bank holds all the trump cards when a joint depositor
dies. Under the court's ruling LA. R.S. 6:32(A) creates no proprietary
interest in the surviving depositor 85 and does not require the decedent's heirs
to give notice to the surviving depositor of their intention to withdraw the
deposited funds, nor the bank to give notice of its intention to release the
funds to the heirs. On the other hand, the bank could, under R.S. 6:32(A),
have released the funds in the joint account to the plaintiff upon proper
demand by the latter, and without undue concern for competing interests not
yet having appeared, in which case the litigation postures of the surviving
depositor and the heirs in Beal might well have been reversed. Thus,
viewing the two statutes in conjunction, the First Circuit holds that, in
essence, the bank may release the balance of a joint account to whichever of
the competing claimants utilizing either statute first appears, so long as no
prior statutorily based notice to the contrary from the other claimants has
been received.8 6 Left unresolved in the Beals opinion is the proper action by
the bank confronted with competing claims to still unreleased funds, but
certainly the bank can utilize Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
4658.
85. The view was expressed by the court that a contrary ruling would too closely
approximate the creation of the common law relationships of joint tenancy (with right
of survivorship) and/or tenancy in common-rules of law contrary to Louisiana
property regimes. 329 So. 2d at 831.
86. The opinion notes, however, that a § 32(A) claimant faces the additional
hurdle of a prior notice to the contrary under § 32(B). Section 32 was amended and
restated during the 1976 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature. See La. Acts
1976, Nos. 216, 316.
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